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We study the effects of policy reforms in the South on the decisions of intrafirm and arm’s 
length production transfers by Northern firms. We show theoretically that relaxing ownership 
controls and improving contract enforcement can induce multinational companies to expand 
product varieties to host developing countries, and that a combination of the two reforms has 
an amplifying effect on product transfers. Consistent with these implications, we find that 
ownership liberalization and judicial quality played an important role in raising the extensive 
margin of processing exports in China for the period of 1997-2007. Our findings imply that 
institutional reforms in developing countries can effectively speed up the product cycle. 
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The introduction of new goods from the innovative North to the South plays an important
role in determining trade patterns as well as welfare in developing countries. In a seminal paper
on product cycles, Vernon (1966) argues that most of the new products are ﬁrst produced in the
industrialized North because the markets in these countries are large and organizing the early stage
of the production in a sophisticated environment is advantageous. Only after a product has become
standardized is manufacturing shifted to the less developed South, where wages are lower. Vernon
highlights the importance of the product cycle, as shifting manufacturing to the South not only
reverses the direction of trade ﬂows but also has signiﬁcant implications for the world income
distribution.
In Vernon’s original formulation of the hypothesis, the length of the product cycle depends
primarily on market and technological factors, such as the economies of scale, transport cost, and
the North-South wage differentials. In subsequent research, many studies have either treated the
rate of technology transfer as a random process or modeled the product standardization process
as inversely related to the age of the good (e.g., Krugman 1979b; Yang and Maskus 2001; Antr` as
2005). As such, these technological parameters do not have an active role in affecting the speed of
product adoption in the South. Later studies have considered the actions of entrepreneurs in both
the North and the South, who devote resources to technology transfers and adaptation, thus short-
ening the product cycle (e.g., Mansﬁeld and Romeo 1980; Lai 1998). However, to our knowledge,
there has not been a systematic analysis of the role of host country institutions and policies in af-
fecting the pace of introducing new goods. The exceptions are Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b),
who argue that government subsidy to imitation in developing countries may increase the average
length of the product cycle.
The main purpose of the current paper is to study the effects of host country institutions and
policies on the introduction and exporting of new goods in developing countries. We incorporate
the role of contract enforcement and ownership liberalization into a product cycle model (Antr` as,
2005), which features both intraﬁrm and arm’s length trade. We show that when host government
2imposes ownership restrictions on foreign subsidiaries, outsourcing through market transactions
becomes the dominant form of production transfers. With the removal of ownership restrictions,
foreign multinationals will introduce new products to the South within ﬁrm boundary. The im-
provement of contract environment in the South reduces the efﬁciency loss due to the “holdup”
problem in an incomplete contract, making the South more attractive. Thus, more new products
will migrate to the South. While improvement in each type of institutions expands the product
varieties through the optimal choices of the foreign multinationals, the liberalization of ownership
structures in combination with better enforcement of contracts ampliﬁes the introduction of new
products to the South. In other words, well-coordinated reforms in the host country can accelerate
the product cycle.1
We test the implications of the model based on the experience of China, where major insti-
tutional reforms occurred concurrently with the dramatic expansion of processing trade in the
period of 1997-2007. To quantify the effect of institutional improvements on the extensive margin
of processing exports, we construct a measure of ownership liberalization at the industry level,
employing a unique Chinese natural experiment in which the government gradually lifted the re-
strictions on ownership structures governing foreign direct investment (FDI). During this period,
the Chinese government expanded the list of “encouraged” industries for FDI while reducing the
list of “restricted or prohibited” industries, aiming to lift the restrictions on foreign capital inﬂows
as China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO). This list, which was documented in the
Guidance for Foreign Investment Industries (NDRC, various years), was ﬁrst published in 1995
and subsequently revised in 1997, 2002, 2004, and 2007. This sequential relaxation of ownership
restrictions on foreign capital cross industries presents a natural experiment to test the effect of
ownership liberalization on trade patterns across ﬁrms of different organizational forms. In addi-
tion, we use an index of judicial efﬁciency from the World Bank (2008) to approximate the degree
1New products play a central role in many trade and growth models. Among recent studies on the determinants
of the ﬁrm product scope in developing countries, Goldberg et al. (2010) ﬁnd that importing new intermediate inputs
is crucial in the introduction of new products by domestic ﬁrms. Moreover,Brambilla (2009) ﬁnds that variety growth
is higher in foreign ﬁrms than in domestic ﬁrms because of their advantages in technology. Our research on the
consequences of the host country policy reforms on product development is complementary to these studies.
3of contract enforcement. To measure the export variety of processing trade, we use an index of the
extensive margin formulated by Feenstra and Kee (2008).
Our empirical results focus on the effects of policy reforms on the variety of processing ex-
ports. We ﬁnd that encouragement policies towards foreign ﬁrms signiﬁcantly increase the variety
of arm’s length export, and they have a much larger effect on the variety of intraﬁrm export. Con-
sistent with our simple model, improvements in the contract environment do not enhance product
development in arm’s length trade, but they have a strong positive effect on product transfers
within multinational companies. Moreover, we ﬁnd an ampliﬁcation effect from the coordination
of reforms. The Chinese data show that contract enforcement and ownership liberalization are
complementary to each other in product development in intraﬁrm trade: the effect of one reform is
larger, if the quality of the other institution is higher. These results are robust to a wide variety of
speciﬁcations. The strong interaction effect of contract enforcement and ownership liberalization
suggests that both reforms in combination are important for new product development in develop-
ing countries.
Our paper is related to the burgeoning body of literature on product cycle and incomplete
contract, including McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002), Levchenko (2007), Antr` as
(2005), and Nunn (2007). These papers typically focus on the effect of contract enforcement on
the boundary of the ﬁrm and comparative advantage in international trade. Our point of departure
is the emphasis on the consequences of host country policy reforms and the timing of product
transfers to the South. Our construction of the ownership liberalization index based on China’s
institutional changes is also unique,2 enabling us to employ a natural experiment for studying the
determinants of export variety in processing trade.
Studies on host country institutions and policies that inﬂuence trade patterns, rates of innova-
tions, and FDI are also related to our paper. These policies include the enforcement of intellectual
propertyrights(e.g., Chin andGrossman1990; Diwan andRodrik1991; GlassandSaggi 1998; Lai
2A similar index for 1997 and 2002 was ﬁrst developed by Blonigen and Ma (2010), who examined the effect of
these ownership regulations on the composition of Chinese exports. We expand this index to 1995, 2004, and 2007,
and investigate the effects of these policies on the product cycle.
41998; Yang and Maskus 2001), government subsidies to innovation and imitation (e.g., Grossman
and Helpman 1991a,b), and institutional variables such as corporate tax rates and bureaucratic
delays and corruption (e.g., Gastanaga et al. 1998; Wei 2000). However, none of these studies
focuses on the consequences of host government ownership restrictions on product transfers to de-
veloping countries. Although some studies have investigated how contract enforcement inﬂuences
the boundary of the ﬁrms, the differential effect of judicial efﬁciency on intraﬁrm and arm’s length
trade is not yet explored.
The current paper is structured as follows. Section II develops a simple model that shows
how the removal of ownership restrictions and improvement in legal enforcement may lead to the
acceleration of product transfers to the South. We analyze the effect of each policy reform and
their amplifying interactive effects. Section III explains the construction of the measures of policy
reforms and presents our empirical ﬁndings. Section IV concludes.
2 The Model
This section relies heavily on the product cycle model of Antr` as (2005) to investigate the con-
sequences of relaxing ownership restrictions and improving contract enforcement on the devel-
opment of new products in developing countries.3 The international business literature has long
emphasized the prevalence of government’s ownership restrictions on multinational companies in
developing countries (e.g., Kobrin 1987; Gomes-Casseres 1990), and a large body of economics
literature has studied the role of contract enforcement in determining the volume of FDI (e.g.,
Gastanaga et al. 1998; Wei 2000). Our model shows how host country reforms in ownership reg-
ulations and judicial efﬁciency can effectively speed up the product cycle. Moreover, the model
generates four testable predictions that provide a basis for subsequent empirical analysis.
3Several other papers, includingAntr` as and Helpman(2008),Acemoglu et al. (2009),and Levchenko(2007),also
model partial incomplete contracts. Following the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2009), we focus the analysis on the
behavior of the Northern supplier. Our predictions on the consequences of improving contract environments in host
countries are consistent with those of Antr` as and Helpman (2008).
52.1 Setup
The world consists of two countries, the North and the South. Labor is the unique factor of
production, which cannot move across the border. There is a unit of consumers with the following
preference:




 ( )  
￿1/ 
, 0 <   < 1
where  ( ) is the total consumption of good  . The elasticity of substitution between goods is
1/(1 −  ). Goods can be free traded without any costs. Accordingly, the demand function for a
particular good   is given by
 ( ) =   ( )
−1/(1− ),
where isafunctionoftotalexpenditureandanaggregatepriceindex. Hence,  ( ) = ( / ( ))1− 
and the revenue is  ( ) =  1−  ( ) .
The ﬁnal-good producer needs headquarter service (ℎ) and an intermediate input ( ) to pro-
duce each unit of output. The production function of the ﬁnal good is
 ( ) =
￿
ℎ
1 −  
￿1−  ￿ 
 
￿ 
, 0 ≤   ≤ 1
where   represents the intensity of the intermediate input in the production. As such,   is in-
terpreted as an indicator of standardization of the good production. Moreover, as the production
function is only different in  ,   also deﬁnes variety. If more varieties are produced in the South,
we interpret it as the South catching up in the product cycle.
Headquarter service provided by the ﬁnal-good producer is assumed to be produced only in the
North. The intermediate input provided by the supplier can be produced both in the North and in
the South. The production of one unit of headquarter service and intermediate input each requires
one unit of labor input. However, there is an iceberg trade cost associated with the production of
the intermediate input in the South: one unit of sale to the North requires   > 1 units of production
in the South. Generally, the sale of the intermediate input is part of the processing export from the
6South to the North.
The ﬁnal-good producer needs to contract with an intermediate-input supplier to produce the
ﬁnal good. She can either purchase the intermediate input from an independent manufacturing
plant or obtain it from an integrated plant. The investment is assumed relation speciﬁc; the ﬁnal-
good producer tailors the headquarter service, and the supplier customizes its intermediate input.
Thus, both parties’ inputs are useless outside the relationship. As the ﬁnal-good producer begins
the contracting process, the supplier needs to pay a lump-sum transfer   because ex ante a large
number of identical and potential manufacturers of the good exist. This lump-sum transfer can
make the suppler break even. Therefore, the contract consists of two organizational choices   ∈
{ , }: vertical integration and arm’s length relationship. Vertical integration implies that the
Northern producer employs the supplier and owns the intermediate input, and arm’s length implies
that the supplier is an independent plant who owns the intermediate input. Hence, trade through
vertical integration is intraﬁrm, whereas trade through arm’s length is interﬁrm. Following the
classical incomplete contract theory, we assume that organizational form is always contractible
and that contractibility of input investment depends on a country’s legal system.
To characterize explicitly the effect of contract environment on product transfers to the South,
we depart from Antr` as (2005) by introducing a probability of a complete contract. Following
Acemoglu et al. (2009), we assume that the probability of completing the contract is   , where
  ∈ { , }, and    ∈ [0,1]. As the North has a better legal system and higher ability for legal
enforcement, it is reasonable to assume    >   . Without the loss of generality, we assume
   = 1, i.e., the contract is complete in the North. Without introducing confusion, we ignore the
subscript of   in   .
The timeline of events is summarized as follows:
1. The ﬁnal-good producer chooses to locate the supplier from country   ∈ { , } and offers
a contract { , , } to the supplier.
2. The supplier decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If accepting, he makes the lump-
sum transfer   to the ﬁnal-good producer.
73. Following acceptance of the contract, there is probability    by which the contract is upheld.
With probability 1 −   , the contract is not upheld; then, bargaining will occur between the
ﬁnal-good producer and the supplier after the product is produced.
4. After the uncertainty is revealed, ℎ and   are produced.
5. If the contract is upheld, the ﬁnal-good producer receives the customized intermediate input
provided by the supplier. Then, the producer manufactures the ﬁnal good, and sells it.
6. If the contract is not upheld, the producer and supplier bargain over the revenue. If Nash
bargain breaks, no output is produced. If a successful Nash bargain occurs, then the producer
pays thesupplierfor theintermediateinput, manufactures to produce theﬁnal good, and sells
it.
The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) can be described by a tuple { ∗, ∗,  ∗,ℎ∗, ∗, ∗},
where  ∗ denotes the optimal organizational form,  ∗ denotes optimal location choice,   ∗ is the
optimalsizeof thelump-sumtransfer, and (ℎ∗, ∗, ∗) are optimalinput levelsand thecorrespond-
ing output of good  . The equilibrium can be solved backwards.
We now consider the decision of a ﬁnal-good producer of good   who needs to ﬁnd a sup-
plier either in the North with higher wage    or in the South with lower wage   , taking other
producers’ behavior as given.
2.2 Supplier in the North
As the contract is complete in the North, the organizational choice is irrelevant by nature of the
incomplete contract theory. Under this scenario, the producer requests the supplier to provide the
intermediate input   and her own headquarter service ℎ to maximize proﬁt,
max
ℎ, 
  =   −  
 ℎ −  
  
 . .   =  
1−  
 
8which yields the ﬁrst-best investment of  ∗ and ℎ∗. The producer pays the supplier    ∗, and
sets the lump-sum transfer   = 0. The producer has the following proﬁt:
 
 ( ) = (1 −  ) [ / 
 ]
 /(1− ) . (1)
2.3 Supplier in the South
If the producer chooses to offshore the intermediate input from the South, she faces the uncer-
tainty of contract environment. With probability  , the contract is complete; thus, the producer can
achieve the ﬁrst-best inputs  ∗ and ℎ∗. However, with probability 1 −  , the contract is incom-
plete; thus, the ex ante contracted input investments are not upheld. In this case, both parties will
under-invest their inputs because of the holdup problem. Given the optimal investment bundles in
the two scenarios, the producer will set the lump-sum transfer   equal to the expected proﬁt of
the supplier. The producer maximizes the expected proﬁts by choosing the optimal organizational
form.
We ﬁrst solve the sub-equilibrium in stages 5 and 6, when the uncertainty of contract environ-
ment is revealed, and then compute the expected proﬁts under different choices of organizational
form. At stage 5, because the contract is upheld in the South, we can follow the case of complete
contract in the North by solving the following problem:
max
ℎ, 
  =   −  
 ℎ −   
  
 . .   =  
1−  
 
whichyieldsthefollowingproﬁtsfortheproducer: ˜   
  ( ) = (1− ) [ (1/  ) (1/(   ))1− ] /(1− ).
At stage 6, the contract is not upheld in the South. The producer and the supplier know that
they will renegotiate their revenue shares after making the investment. Thus, the supplier chooses
intermediateinput( ) tomaximizerevenueminuscost (includingshippingcost), andtheproducer
chooses headquarter service (ℎ) to maximize her own revenue minus cost. They also know that
9their revenue depends on consumer demand and the simultaneous investment of the other party.
Suppose the producer’s revenue share is   ∈ [0,1]. The value of   depends on the organizational
form, as we will discuss below.
Therefore, the supplier chooses intermediate input   to solve the following problem:
max
 
  = (1 −  )  −   
  
 . .   =  
1−  
 
Similarly, the producer chooses headquarter service ℎ to solve the following problem:
max
ℎ
  =    −  
 ℎ
 . .   =  
1−  
 
The solutions to these two problems will yield optimal headquarter service ℎ( ) and intermediate
input  ( ). The corresponding proﬁts for the producer and the supplier in stage 6 are ˜   
1( , ) =
  (ℎ( ), ( )) −   ℎ( ), and ˜   
2( , ) = (1 −  ) (ℎ( ), ( )) −     ( ).
At stage 3, the contract environment is unknown to the producer and supplier; thus, their ex-
pected proﬁts are the weighted proﬁts from stages 5 and 6. Hence, the producer can set the lump-
sum transfer   equal to the supplier’s expected proﬁts [  ∗ 0 + (1 −  )˜   
2( , )]. Thus, if the
producer chooses the Southern supplier, her expected proﬁt at stage 1 is
 
 ( , ) =  ˜  
 
  ( ) + (1 −  )˜  
 
1( , ) +   (2)
=  ˜  
 
  ( ) + (1 −  )˜  
 
1( , ) + (1 −  )˜  
 
2( , )
=  ˜  
 
  ( ) + (1 −  )˜  
 ( , )
10where
˜  
 ( , ) = ˜  
 
1( , ) + ˜  
 
2( , )
=  (ℎ( ), ( )) −  
 ℎ( ) −   
  ( )
=  [1 −   (1 −  ) −  (1 −  ) ][ ( / 
 )
1− ((1 −  )/(  
 ))
 ]
 /(1− ) .
2.4 Offshoring and Ownership Choice
With a decision to offshore its intermediate input to the South, the Northern producer needs
to choose an organizational form: vertical integration (intraﬁrm trade) or arm’s length transaction
(interﬁrm trade). We assume a symmetric Nash bargain in relation-speciﬁc investment. According
to Grossman and Hart (1986), the choice of organizational form affects the parties’ outside values.
In arm’s length transaction, each agent has control over her own input, with zero outside values
once the Nash bargain breaks up. This condition implies an equal revenue share for each agent,
   = 1/2. However, in vertical integration, the producer owns the plant, and the supplier is
an employee. If the supplier does not provide the intermediate input with sufﬁcient quality, the
producer can ﬁre the supplier, who will be left with nothing, and seize the intermediate input  .
The producer can still obtain a fraction   ∈ (0,1) of the output, which in turn generates sale
revenue of    . The quasi-rent of this relationship is (1 −   ) . Symmetric Nash bargaining
leaves each party with its outside option plus one-half of the quasi-rent. Hence, the producer’s ex
post share in sales revenue is    = 1
2(1 +   ). Consequently, we have
1 >  
  >  
  = 1/2 .
The Northern producer chooses production locations, as well as the optimal form of organiza-
tion, if offshoring takes place in the South. Therefore, her ex ante expected proﬁt is
 ( ) = max
 ∈{ , }, ∈{ , }
{ 
 ( ), 
 ( , 
 ), 
 ( , 
  )} . (3)
11It can be shown that ￿
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  + (1 −  )
1 −   (1 −  ) −  (1 −  ) 
1 −  
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and   ∈ { , }. Hence, for a given  ,   ( ) >   ( ,  ) if and only if   ( ) >  / , and
  ( ,   ) >   ( ,  ) if and only if    ( ) <   ( ).
Figure 1 shows the coexistence of the three types of production modes: exclusive production
in the North, vertical integration across the border, and arm’s length production sharing. We can
obtain the following key lemma of Antr` as (2005) (see the proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 1 For the most headquarter-service-intensive (least-standardized) goods, the intermedi-
ate input production remains in the North. For the relatively less headquarter-service-intensive
goods, the intermediate input production is likely to be offshored through vertical integration. For
the least headquarter-service-intensive goods, the intermediate input production is outsourced to
the South.
Note that under certain conditions, vertical integration may not be an optimal arrangement
for the supply of the intermediate input. For instance, if the  /  line goes through the intercept
of    and    curves, the production in the North and arm’s length trade will dominate vertical
integration. Intraﬁrm arrangement is also not optimal if the trade cost is too high, which lowers the
 /  line below the    curve, or if the contract enforcement is too poor, which raises the    curve
above the  /  line. The coexistence of the three organizational forms provides a rich analytical
framework.
Our primary interest is to examine the role of host country policy reforms in affecting the
pace of product transfers to the developing countries. Based on the above lemma, as the product
becomes more standardized, the Northern ﬁrms will eventually offshore their production of the
12intermediate inputs to the South. Vernon (1966) analyzes the factors determining the length of the
product cycle, which refers to the duration between the time of product innovation in the North
and the time of adopting its production in the South. As a product matures, factors such as the
economies of scale, transport costs, and the North-South wage differentials become important
determinants of the locational choice. Antr` as (2005) points out that differences in the contract
environment in the North and the South will automatically generate a product cycle. In what
follows, we willinvestigatehowthe relaxation ofownershiprestrictions for foreign capital inﬂows,
improvements in contract enforcement, and reduction in trade cost may help speed up the product
cycle.
Governments in developing countries often restrict the activities of wholly-owned foreign in-
vested ﬁrms for reasons including reducing competitionwith indigenous ﬁrms, promoting technol-
ogy transfer through joint ventures, and controlling strategic sectors (e.g., Kobrin 1987; Gomes-
Casseres 1990; Feenstra and Hanson, 2005). In an extreme case of a strict prohibition of wholly-
owned foreign ﬁrms, the dotted    curve would disappear from Figure 1. As a result, only arm’s
length trade would take place. Under this situation, the cutoff between Northern and Southern
productions is ¯    . If the ownership restriction is removed,    becomes part of the choice set.
Therefore, the cutoff between North and South productions moves left to ¯     , i.e., more goods
will be offshored to the South through vertical integration. However, the extensive margin of arm’s
length export willbe reduced because the supplyof somegoods will beswitched from arm’s length
production to vertical integration. We summarize these effects of ownership liberalization in the
South as the ﬁrst testable hypothesis:4
Result 1 Ownership liberalization, which allows vertical integration in the South, increases the
extensive margin of intraﬁrm export but reduces the extensive margin of arm’s length export. As a
result, the total variety of Southern export also increases.
4Ownership liberalization not only promotes the extensive margin of Southern export but also makes its export
structure more headquarter-service (or skill) intensive. As these issues go beyond the scope of this paper, we study
systematically the skill upgrading of Southern export in a companion paper (Sheng and Yang, 2011).
13Improvement in contract environment can be characterized by an increase in  . As Figure 2
shows, a larger   shifts down the    and    curves, thus raising the extensive margin of intraﬁrm
export. However, because the intercept between    and    is independent of  , the extensive
margin of arm’s length export does not change. We state the second hypothesis as follows:
Result 2 Better contract enforcement (a rise in  ) increases the extensive margin of intraﬁrm
export, but it has a neutral effect on the product variety of arm’s length export. As a result, the
extensive margin of Southern export increases.
Trade cost reduction is characterized by a decrease in  . As Figure 2 shows, a fall in   shifts up
the horizontal line / . This movementraises theextensivemargin ofintraﬁrm export, as shipping
back the intermediate good produced in the South is now cheaper. However, because the cutoff
between intraﬁrm and arm’s length trade remains the same as before, the extensivemargin of arm’s
length arrangement does not change. The following is a straightforward result:
Result 3 Reduction in trade cost (a fall in  ) increases the extensive margin of intraﬁrm export,
but it has a neutral effect on the extensive margin of arm’s length export. As a result, the extensive
margin of Southern export increases.
Given the consequences of individual reforms in Results 1 and 2, exploring the effects of coor-
dinated reforms is also important. If the South relaxes its ownership controls in combination with
improvements in legal systems, growth in the extensive margin through intraﬁrm export would be
even larger. As Figure 2 shows, permittingvertical integrationaloneincreases theextensivemargin
from ¯    to ¯     , and a simultaneous improvement in contract environment will further expand the
extensive margin from ¯     to ¯  ′
   . This framework suggests that contract enforcement and own-
ership liberalization are complementary factors for product transfers in intraﬁrm trade: the effect
of one reform is larger if the quality of the other institution is higher. This ampliﬁcation effect is
summarized as follows:
14Result 4 (AmpliﬁcationEffect) Coordinated reforms in ownership liberalizationand contract en-
forcement mutually enhance the effects of each other and amplify the growth of the extensive mar-
gin through intraﬁrm export in the South.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Key Variables
We test the implications of the model against the Chinese experience when major institu-
tional reforms occurred concurrently with the dramatic expansion of processing trade surrounding
China’s entry into the WTO. The primary data source we use is the Chinese customs trade data for
the period of 1997-2007. The dataset records both the value and quantity of trade at the product
level (eight-digit HS code), export locations, ﬁrm ownership category, and type of Chinese cus-
tom regimes. Our analysis focuses on processing export because it is an integrated part of global
production sharing and is closely related to the product cycle. Processing export is an activity
that involves a ﬁrm in China importing intermediate input from aboard, processing it with other
local productive factors, and then exporting the ﬁnished goods to international markets. Imported
intermediate input is duty-free as long as it is only used for export (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005).
In other words, it is the offshored production from developed countries. Processing trade plays a
major role in China’s international trade, accounting for about 55 percent of total export for the
1997-2007 period.
The ﬁrm ownership types in the trade data include Chinese-owned domestic ﬁrms, joint ven-
tures, and wholly-owned foreign ﬁrms. We consider wholly-owned foreign ﬁrms as vertically in-
tegrated afﬁliates (intraﬁrm trade) and the other two ownership types as unafﬁliated plants (arm’s
length trade).
Our deﬁnition of variety is an eight-digit HS product-destination country pair, namely, a prod-
uct exporting to one particular country. For empirical analysis, China is treated as the South,
whereas the rest of the world is treated as the North. For robustness checks, we use high-income
15countries as the North and deﬁne variety as an eight-digit HS product. Our main empirical results
are very robust to these alternative variable deﬁnitions.
The extensive margin can be simply measured as the number of varieties. However, this mea-
sure ignores the volume weights of export for different varieties. Therefore, we follow Feenstra
and Kee (2008)to construct an extensivemargin measure, which takes exportweights intoaccount.
It also has the advantage of comparability over time, across regions and ﬁrm organizational forms.
The extensive margin is deﬁned as the following Λ ratio:
Λ
 
    =
P
 ∈ r
iot   
  ( )
P
 ∈ F
i   
  ( )
(4)
where   denotes a product, and   
    is the set of products that province   exports in industry  
through organizational form   in year  . We deﬁne   
  =
S
 , ,    
    as the total set of products that
China exported to the rest of the world in industry   over all sample years.   
  ( ) is the average
value of export for product   (i.e., summed over all provinces and organization forms and averaged
across years). Note that thismeasure ofthe extensivemargin changes overtimeor across provinces
or organizational forms only if there is a change in the set of export goods in that province,   
   .
The denominator of the ratio is constant over time, across provinces and organizational forms. By
taking the union of all China’s exported products overthe years, we obtain a consistent comparison
across all three dimensions. The value of Λ 
    is in the interval of [0,1].
Table1presentsthesummarystatisticsofChina’sprocessingexportanditsextensivemarginby
ﬁrm organizationalforms. TheﬁrsttwocolumnsshowthatChina’sprocessingexporthasincreased
dramatically since its accession to WTO in 2001 and that most of this increase is attributable to
wholly-owned foreign ﬁrms. During this 11-year period, the share of intraﬁrm trade in processing
export increased from 29 percent to 64 percent. The extensive margin, measured by both number
of varieties and Feenstra and Kee’s (2008) index, also increased dramatically. A noticeable trend is
that the extensive margin of intraﬁrm trade gradually caught up with the extensive margin of arm’s
length trade. Whereas product variety in intraﬁrm trade was systematically below that of interﬁrm
16trade in the late 1990s, the gap was almost entirely eliminated by 2007.
The rising role of intraﬁrm export in China is a consequence of ownership liberalization for
foreign capital in the face ofChina’s accession to WTO in 2001. Wholly foreign-owned companies
were restricted or prohibited in China in the 1990s, whereas joint ventures were encouraged. The
main target of such policy was to maximize the access to foreign advanced technologies, as it was
perceived that learning costs were much lower within ﬁrms. However, China undertook a major
regulatory reform regarding foreign trade and investment in the face of the WTO accession in
2001. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) explicitly precludes
WTO members from imposing restrictions or distortions on foreign investment. To comply with
the provisions of the TRIMs agreement, China modiﬁed many laws regulating trade and foreign
investment, encouraging foreign ﬁrms to compete on an equal basis with Chinese companies. For
instance, for the ﬁrst time in 2001, the revision of “the Rules for the Implementation of the Law
of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Capital Enterprises” conﬁrmed foreigners’ rights to
their intellectual properties. It stated that “industrial property rights and proprietary technology
to be contributed as investment by a foreign investor must be owned by the foreign investor.” In
previous documents, industrial property rights and proprietary technology were treated as part of
capital investment, and they could not exceed 20 percent of the total foreign capital.5 These policy
reforms resulted in changes in the ownership structures of FDI to China. Joint ventures played a
dominant role in FDI inﬂows before 2001. By 2008, however, foreign-owned ﬁrms accounted for
78 percent of China’s annual FDI inﬂow (NBS, 2009b).
We construct a unique measure of ownership liberalization using the ofﬁcial list from the Chi-
nese government that speciﬁes which industries are encouraged, restricted, or prohibited for for-
eign investment. This list, provided in the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment
Industries (NDRC, various years), was ﬁrst published in 1995 and was revised subsequently in
1997, 2002, 2004, and 2007. For encouraged industries, foreign investors have more freedom in
choosing their ownership structures, and they enjoy other advantages such as preferable corpo-
5See Branstetter and Lardy (2008) for detailed discussions on China’s policy changes upon its WTO accession.
17rate tax rates, low costs of land, and duty-free for imported inputs. In contrast, for restricted or
prohibited industries, the Chinese government usually imposes stringent restrictions on ownership
structures and high entry cost for foreign investors.
The listed industries or products under encouragement or restriction policies follow roughly
the structures of the 2002 China Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (CSIC) coding, in which each
listed item could be matched with multiple products in different industries. Based on a systematic
key word search, an industry is identiﬁed as under an encouragement policy (or restriction policy)
if a listed item can be matched with the industry under the 2002 CSIC codes, a method consistent
with Blonigen and Ma (2007).6 To providean overview of the ownershipliberalization process, we
countthenumberofindustriesunderencouragementand restrictionpoliciesin thefourdigitsofthe
2002 CSIC coding for each year. The results are presented in Figure 4. The data show a clear trend
of ownership liberalization for foreign capital from 1995 to 2007. Two major jumps in encouraged
industries are found in 2002, the year after China’s accession to WTO, and in 2007, the year after
the Chinese government promised to remove most of the trade and investment protections. By
2007, only 54 out of the 482 industries in the manufacturing sector still had restrictions for foreign
capital. These restrictions were only imposed on selected products in these industries.
For subsequent regression analysis, we construct two proxies for ownership liberalization at
the industry level: an encouragement policy indicator and a restriction (includes prohibited) policy
indicator. We assign the value of 1 for encouragement (or restriction) policy in an industry if at
least one product in that industry is formally stated on the government list of encouragement (or
restriction). Otherwise, we assign the value of 0 to that industry. We also assume that there are no
policy changes until a formal revision is announced in the published Catalogue. These two policy
indicators capture the differences in ownership regulations between industries with and without
policy interventions.
For the measurement of contract environment, we follow the literature on the inﬂuence of
6We use two documents to identify the associated CSIC industrial codes for the key words: 2002 CSIC and
2005 Product Classiﬁcation for Statistics (NBS, 2005). The 2005 PCS is based on the 2002 CSIC, but it is more
disaggregated, containing more than 34,000 products at the 10-digit level.
18institutional quality on the trade pattern (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007; Feenstra et al., 2010).
These studies use the indexes of doing business in 30 provincial capitals in China published by the
World Bank (2008). Speciﬁcally, we use a “court cost” variable, which is measured as the ratio of
ofﬁcial costs of going through court procedures to the debt claim. Higher “court cost” indicates an
inefﬁcient, rent-seeking legal system, implying a lower probability of upholding contracts between
ﬁrms. For convenience of interpretation, we construct a court efﬁciency measure, which equals
0.5 minus the ratio of court cost, as in Feenstra et al. (2010).7 The spatial differences in court
efﬁciency in China are substantial. The Southeast coastal provinces usually have higher levels of
court efﬁciency than do interior and northern provinces.
To approximate trade cost, we use the cumulative number of national policy zones that had
been opened up to a year in a speciﬁc province.8 China began to establish special economic zones
for export in the early 1980 in coastal cities. Owing to their initial success, special zones were
expandedintoinlandcities(Wang,2010). ThesepolicyzonesincludeEconomicandTechnological
Development Zone, High-Tech Development Area, Bonded Area, Export Processing Zone, and
other types. Multinational companies in these zones enjoy various advantages, including lowered
corporate tax rate of 15 percent, duty free for imported inputs, no import quotas, low costs of land,
and no property tax in the ﬁrst ﬁve years. There are also additional beneﬁts for foreign ﬁrms if
they export most of their products. The data reveal two booming periods of policy zones: the ﬁrst
is 1990-1993 when the cumulative number of zones jumped from 18 to 130, and the second is
1999-2003 when the number increased from 139 to 196. By 2006, a total of 221 policy zones had
been established in China. Their existence has reduced the costs of international trade.
7World Bank (2008) also provides two other measures of contract environment: “court time,” which measures the
time interval between the time the plaintiff ﬁles the lawsuit and the time of payment, and “court rank” of the court
system in each provincialcapitalbased onthe measures of“courtcost” and “courttime.” As NathanNunnpoints outin
Feenstra et al. (2010), either a very short period of time or a very long period of time can be an indicator of inefﬁcient
legal system; as such, there is no monotonic relationship between court time and court efﬁciency. We also agree with
this point; thus, we use the court cost as a measure of judicial efﬁciency in our study.
8The data source is China Development Zone Review Announcement Catalogue (NDRC, 2007). We adopt this
measure of trade cost rather than tariff because of two reasons. First, all imports for processing export are duty-free in
China, and outward export tariffs are difﬁcult to compute. Even if outward export tariffs are available at the product
level, there is no variation across provinces. Second, the setup of national policy zones requires authorization from
the central government, which can be arguably considered as an exogenous process beyond the control of provincial
governments. Therefore, the endogeneity problem is not a major concern.
193.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
We assess the role of institutionsand policies as determinants of product varieties in processing
exports. The dependent variable for analysis, ln(      ), is the log value of the extensive margin
ofindustry andorganizationalform  inprovince  and year . Theprincipleexplanatoryvariables
are (1) an indicator variable for organizational form (i.e.,       = 1 for intraﬁrm export, and
      = 0 for arm’s length export); (2) two indices of policy reforms, i.e.,      for encouragement
policy and      for restriction policy; (3) an index of court efﬁciency, which approximates the
degree of contract enforcement or institutional quality (  ); and (4) the cumulative number of
national policy zones, a proxy for trade cost (    ). The basic estimation equation is
  (      ) =  1      +  2     +  3     +  4   +  5    




      +    ln(      ) +    ln    +
X
 
        +    +    +       .
This speciﬁcation controls for a set of province-speciﬁc geographic variables (   ), including the
log value of minimum arc distance to two major ports in China (i.e., Shanghai and Hong Kong)
and two dummy variables indicating whether a province has an international border and a coastal
line, respectively. Accordingly, we do not use provincial dummies to control for regional ﬁxed
effects. We also add population density ln(      ) and provincial real output ln    as controls
for the market size effect that larger economies usually export more varieties (Krugman, 1979a).
Moreover, following Romalis (2004) and Nunn (2007), we also include the interaction (     ) of
industry-speciﬁc factor intensities (i.e., skill intensity and capital intensity) with province-speciﬁc
factor endowments (i.e., college share and capital output ratio) to capture the effects of locational
comparative advantages.9 {  ,  } are industry and yearly dummies, and       is a stochastic distur-
9The college share is deﬁned as the proportion of college graduates in the population above age 5 (NBS, various
years). The capitaloutputratiois deﬁnedas capital stock in real termsdividedbythe real GDP. We obtainedthe capital
stock ﬁgures from Bai et al. (2006) and computed real GDP numbers based on China’s Compendium of Statistics of
1949-2008 (NBS, 2009a). We rely on the 1995 Chinese National Industry Census (TNICO, 1997) to compute skill
intensity by industry, which is deﬁned as the share of workers with college education in total industrial employment,
20bance term. Note that the interaction terms between the organizational type and policy variables
allow us to test the differential effects of policy reforms on the export variety of intraﬁrm versus
arm’s length arrangements.
To avoid the potential contemporaneous correlations between provincial variables with the er-
ror term, we use one-year lagged values of trade liberalization measures and thoseof factor endow-
ment as the benchmark speciﬁcation.10 In addition, as Lu et al. (2008) and Feenstra et al. (2010)
point out, the contract environment variable (  ) is likely to be endogenous to trade volume, as
well as our measure of the extensivemargin of processing export. We follow their practice of using
former colonial rule, i.e., by British, France, Russia, or a combination of multiple powers, as well
as provincial population in 1953 as instrumentsfor contract environment. We will ﬁrst estimatethe
above empirical function by OLS and then report the IV results using GMM. We will test for weak
instruments using an F-test in the ﬁrst-stage regression, as recommended by Stock et al. (2002).
The F-test statistics are all above the Stock-Yogo criteria of 10, rejecting the notion of weak instru-
ments. Consequently, our discussions and interpretations of the results will be largely based on the
IV estimates.
3.3 Estimation Results
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 2 report the OLS and IV estimates of a simpliﬁed speciﬁcation
without the interaction of intraﬁrm dummy variable and key policy variables. Therefore, these are
regressions on the determinants of export varieties in the processing trade without distinguishing
the differential effect of policies on intraﬁrm and arm’s length trade. Although these results do not
providedirect tests on the implicationsof the model, several results emerge, and they remain stable
across the alternative speciﬁcations.
First, the estimates for the intraﬁrm indicator variable are negative, showing that, on average,
andindustrialcapitalintensity,whichis deﬁnedasthelogratioofnetﬁxedcapitaloverthetotalindustrialemployment.
10The changes in national polices on ownership regulationsare arguablyexogenousto industryand provincialvari-
ables becausethe progressof reformsdependedlargelyonthe decisionsofthe centralgovernmentandthe membership
rules of the WTO regarding FDI investments. Our empirical analysis reveals that the main estimation results are not
sensitive to alternative speciﬁcations of these variables.
21the extensive margin of processing export by vertically integrated ﬁrms is less than that of the
arm’s length trade. This result is not surprising because for many years the share of intraﬁrm trade
was less than that of arm’s length trade. Second, the encouragement policy and special trade zones
generally increase the extensive margin of the Chinese processing export, whereas the restriction
policy presents a barrier to the growth of the extensive margin. Court efﬁciency has a positive but
insigniﬁcant effect on product variety. This result is consistent with the predictions of the model
because improvements in contract enforcement have a neutral effect on processing trade through
market transactions (Result 2). Third, the results of the geographic and market size variables are
consistent with the existing literature. The further away a region is from the two major ports,
the fewer the variety of its export. Coastal provinces have more export varieties than do interior
provinces, but having a land-connected international border does not increase variety for Chinese
provinces. The signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcients for population density and real output imply
that the large size of provincial economy leads to more export varieties. The positive coefﬁcients
of the interaction terms of skill intensity and college share, and those of capital intensity and
capital output ratio suggest that more skill (capital)-intensive industries export more varieties in
skill (capital)-abundant regions.
The results from estimating the baseline equation are reported in columns (3) and (4), which
lend support to the model’s predictions. These speciﬁcations include the interactions of organiza-
tional form (     ) and other key variables of policies and trade cost. Therefore, they can provide
evidence on whether our variables of interest have differential effects on product variety across
intraﬁrm and arm’s length trade. Based on the IV estimates, the encouragement policy raises the
extensive margins of arm’s length and intraﬁrm processing export by    (0.22) − 1 = 24 per-
cent and    (0.22 + 0.168) − 1 = 47 percent, respectively, compared with those in industries
without such policy. This ﬁnding is consistent with Result 1, i.e., the relaxation of ownership
restrictions strongly increases the variety of intraﬁrm export as well as total processing export.
Perhaps an unexpected result is that the extensive margin of arm’s length export also increases,
which goes beyond the prediction of the model. However, this result is hardly surprising because
22the industries targeted by the government encouragement policies are also likely to receive other
preferential treatments, have reduced bureaucratic barriers, and encounter lower entry costs for all
types of ﬁrms, thus leading to expansion in the processing trade by indigenous Chinese ﬁrms and
joint ventures. As a result of ownership liberalization, positive productivity spillover to Chinese
ﬁrms by the growing presence of multinational companies may also promote new product devel-
opment (Chen and Swenson, 2007). In contrast to ownership liberalization, the restriction policy
signiﬁcantly reduces intraﬁrm export variety by 1 −    (−0.267) = 23 percent, whereas it has an
insigniﬁcant effect on the export variety of arm’s length trade.
The IV estimates in column (4) also provide strong empirical support to Result 2. The large
coefﬁcient for the interaction of intraﬁrm and court efﬁciency suggests that contract enforcement
has a signiﬁcantly positive effect on the export variety of vertically integrated multinational com-
panies. Consistent with the model’s prediction, contract environment does not signiﬁcantly affect
the variety of arm’s length export because improvements in contract enforcement do not alter the
cutoff point between vertical integration and market transactions (Figure 2). Overall, the effect of
institutional quality on the product variety of intraﬁrm trade is large. Consider the inland province
of Sichuan, which has a court efﬁciency index of 8.99 percent, and the coastal city of Shanghai,
which has an index value at 26.65 percent. The estimated coefﬁcients imply that, if Sichuan had
the same efﬁcient court system as Shanghai, ceteris paribus, the intraﬁrm export variety would
increase by 33 percent (=    (1.633 ∗ (26.65% − 8.99%)) − 1).
The establishment of national policy zones also has signiﬁcantly positive effects on product
development in the processing trade. Based on the estimates, the opening of one additional policy
zone in a province is associated with 12 percent and 9 percent increases in intraﬁrm and arm’s
length export varieties, respectively. Whereas the effect on vertical integration is consistent with
Result 3, the effect of policy zones on arm’s length export variety could stem from similarspillover
effects or preferable policies related to the opening of special zones for all types of ﬁrms, as we
discussed in the case of encouragement policy.
Our product cycle model highlights an ampliﬁcation effect from the coordination of reforms.
23Themainidea isthat contract enforcement and ownershipliberalizationare complementarytoeach
other in intraﬁrm trade: the effect of one reform is larger if the quality of the other institution is
higher. To test the implications of Result 4, we present the estimation results of triple interactions
of organization form, ownership policies, and contract environment variables in columns (5) and
(6) of Table 2. The interaction term of intraﬁrm-encouragement policy-court efﬁciency is large
and signiﬁcantly positive,indicatingstrong complementaritybetween ownershipliberalization and
contract environment for multinational companies. To illustrate the size of the amplifying effect,
consider two coastal provinces, Shandong and Fujian provinces. In terms of contract efﬁciency,
Shandong is at the median of the provinces, whereas Fujian is ranked at the top 25 percentile. With
lower court efﬁciency in Shandong, having encouragement policy would increase its intraﬁrm
export variety by 13 percent (=    (−0.776 + 3.201 ∗ 0.28) − 1), whereas with higher court
efﬁciency in Fujian, the same policy reform would raise its export variety by a much higher 47
percent (=    (−0.776+3.201∗0.36)−1), both relative to industries without the encouragement
policy. Therefore, differences in contract environment may lead to signiﬁcantly different outcomes
under the same reform scheme.11 This result has important policy implications, suggesting that
well-coordinated reforms are crucial for speeding up the product cycle.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we carry out robustness checks for our previous ﬁndings. Included in the ex-
ercise are alternative measures of the extensive margin, the log value of processing export as the
dependent variable, and the use of high-income countries as the North in the regression analysis.
We ﬁnd that all the major results are robust to these alternative speciﬁcations.
First, weemploytwoalternativemeasuresoftheextensivemargin. Theﬁrstisastraightforward
11Theseestimates implythat the effectofthe encouragementpolicyonproductvarietyis realizedprimarilythrough
thetriple interactionterm. Whenthe courtefﬁciencyis low, theroleofownershipliberalizationis verylimited. Indeed,
whenwesetcourtefﬁciencytozero,thenegativecoefﬁcientoftheinteractionofintraﬁrmindicatorandencouragement
policyimpliesthat the productvarietyofintraﬁrmexportis evenlower thaninterﬁrmexportsbecauseofthe depressing
inﬂuenceofpoorinstitutions onverticalintegration. Theoretically,it is plausiblethat in this extremecase, theintraﬁrm
offshoringmay not exist; hence, the encouragementpolicy only increases the extensive margin of arm’s length export.
24count of product varieties, in which variety is still deﬁned as the eight-digit HS product-country
pair. The second measure is a redeﬁned variety by an eight-digit HS product, but it is still com-
puted as an extensive margin index following Feenstra and Kee (2008). The number of varieties is
reduced because of the broader scope of the deﬁnition. Table 3 presents the IV regression results
based on these two alternative measures. The results are highly consistent with our benchmark
ﬁndings, especially in the interaction terms with intraﬁrm export, reconﬁrming the fact that the
effects of host country reforms on the product cycle are not sensitive to the use of different mea-
sures of the extensive margin. One noticeable difference is that the estimated coefﬁcients for the
encouragement policy in columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 have turned statistically insigniﬁcant pos-
itive numbers from previously signiﬁcantly positive numbers in columns (4) and (6) in Table 2.
This ﬁnding lends direct support to our hypothesis in Result 1; i.e., ownership liberalization does
not increase the extensive margin of arm’s length export. Another difference is that the estimated
coefﬁcients for the restriction policy in columns (2) and (3) have turned statistically signiﬁcant
positive numbers from insigniﬁcant estimates in columns (4) and (6) in Table 2. This result does
not go against our theoretical predictions either. It simply implies that ownership controls on for-
eign ownership may actually increase the export variety of arm’s length arrangement because of
reduced foreign competition. These two estimation differences suggest that using the number of
export variety as the dependent variable may bring additional evidence in support of the theoretical
predictions.
Another interpretation of these above differences in estimation results is caused by the weight-
ing schemes in the two measures of the extensivemargin. The mechanical count of product variety
does not consider the export volume of each product. However, Feenstra and Kee’s index is a
weighted number of products, in which the weights are the average export value over the sample
period. Therefore, it makes sense if the encouragement (restriction) policy increases (deceases)
the export value in these preferred industries, as shown in Table 2.
Second, Table 4 presents the IV regressionresults when thedependent variableis the log export
value. The results are again broadly consistent with our benchmark estimation. One noticeable
25ﬁnding is that the ampliﬁcation effect of court efﬁciency on intraﬁrm export in the encouraged
industry becomes even larger. Taking the same cases of Shandong and Fujian as examples, the
encouragement policy now increases the intraﬁrm export by 10 percent and 56 percent in the two
provinces, respectively, relative to those industries without an encouragement policy. Recall that
thecorrespondingampliﬁcationeffect is 13percent and47 percent, respectively,forthebenchmark
case of the extensive margin.
Lastly, instead of using all other countries as the North, we select all high-income countries as
the North. Our deﬁnition of high-income countries follows the World Bank’s standard classiﬁca-
tion; China’s export to high-income countries accounts for about 89 percent of the total processing
export.12 Table 5 presents the estimation results based on the high-income country sample using
both the extensive margin index and export value as dependent variables. Again, all results are
broadly consistent with our benchmark ﬁndings.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the effects of host country policy reforms on the decisions of multina-
tional companies to make product transfers to developing countries. We incorporate the liberal-
ization of ownership structures and improvement in contract environment into a model of product
cycle, which features intraﬁrm and arm’s length trade. Our model suggests that, while ownership
liberalization has a direct positive effect on expanding product variety to the South, a simulta-
neous reform of raising judicial efﬁciency can achieve a large, amplifying effect. Based on the
recent Chinese experience, our empirical ﬁndings have provided strong support for the theoretical
prediction that policy reforms can speed up the product cycle.
Governments in developing countries aspire to attract direct investment by multinational com-
panies with new products and advanced technologies. However, their strategies vary. Some gov-
ernments prohibit wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries from entering the local markets; rather, they
12Taiwan is not included in the World Bank’s data, although it qualiﬁes for a high-income region. We add Taiwan
into our sample because it is an important trade partner of mainland China.
26encourage the establishment of joint-ventures while imposing technology-sharing mandates. Our
research suggests that these policies may lead to undesired outcomes. The reason is that, under
stringent ownership restrictions, multinational companies will ﬁnd it unattractive to set up their
subsidiaries in the South and bring in advanced products. Instead, they will only transfer less
advanced products to the South through arm’s length transactions. In contrast, if the host coun-
try governments choose to liberalize their ownership structures with concurrent improvements in
contract enforcement, they will attract the transfer of more advanced products through intraﬁrm
processing trade. The shortened product cycle will in turn contribute to economic growth and
welfare in developing countries.
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31Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
We ﬁrst derive the properties of   ( ) for   ∈ { ,  }. Consider the case in which the
producer chooses an independent Southern ﬁrm to produce the intermediate input. With   = 1/2,
we have
 
 ( ) =
￿
  + (1 −  )
1 − 1/2 






It is easy to show that   ( ) has the following proposition:
Proposition 1
(1)   (1) > 1, lim →0  ( ) = ∞,   
  ( ) < 0, and   
  ( ) < 0.
(2) If   (1) <  / , there exists a unique cutoff ¯    , such that   (¯    ) =  / , and   ( ) >
 /  if   < ¯    , and   ( ) <  /  if   > ¯    .
Given   ∈ (0,1),  ( ) = (1 −   ) 
￿
1−￿ is an increasing function for   ∈ [0,1], thus
1−1/2 
1−  (1/2) /(1− ) < 1, and the term in the bracket of   ( ) is less than 1. Therefore, it is
easy to show   (1) > 1, lim →0  ( ) = ∞, and   
  ( ) < 0 and   
  ( ) < 0. As shown in
Figure 1,   ( ) decreases in  . Thus, if   (1) <  / , then there exists a unique cutoff ¯    , such
that   (¯    ) =  / ,   ( ) >  /  if   < ¯    , and   ( ) <  /  if   > ¯    .
We can show that with the same assumptions in Antras(2005), the    ( ) curve has similar
properties:
Proposition 2
(1)    (1) >   (1), lim →0   ( ) = ∞, and   
  ( ) < 0.
(2) If    < 1/2, i.e.,    < 3/4, then   
  ( ) < 0.
(3) If    (1) <  / , there exists a unique cutoff ¯     , such that    (¯     ) =  / ,    ( ) >  / 
if   < ¯     , and    ( ) <  /  if   > ¯     .
32(4) There exists a unique cutoff ¯     , such that   (¯     ) =    (¯     ),   ( ) >    ( ) if   <
¯     , and   ( ) <    ( ) if   > ¯     . Moreover, this cutoff ¯     is independent of  .
We know
 
  ( ) =
￿
  + (1 −  )
1 −    (1 −  ) −  (1 −   ) 
1 −  
[( 
  )






Hence,    (1) =
h
  + (1 −  )
1− (1− V )
1−  (1 −    ) /(1− )
i− 1−￿
￿
, and given the property of  ( )
and    ∈ (1/2,1), we know 0 <  (1 −    ) <  (1/2). Then,   + (1 −  ) (1 −    ) <
  + (1 −  ) (1/2), and thus    (1) >   (1).
Next, deﬁneΦ( , ) ≡
1− [ (1− )+(1− ) ]
1−  [ 1− (1− ) ] /(1− ), whichislessthan
1− [ +(1− )]
1−  [11− ∗
1 ] /(1− ) < 1. Therefore,   + (1 −  )Φ( , ) < 1, and a rising   increases (  + (1 −  )Φ( , ))
for a given  . Thus, lim →0   ( ) = ∞, and   
  ( ) < 0.
For proposition 2(2), if   = 0, it reduces to the case in Antras (2005). Antras shows that
   < 1/2 is the sufﬁcient condition for   
  ( ) < 0. For the general case   ∈ (0,1), this inequality
becomes intractable. However, Matlab simulations for possible values of  , ,  suggest that this
sufﬁcient condition still holds. It is reasonable because as   increases from 0 to 1, the severity of
contract incompleteness declines.
Given the propositions 2(1) and 2(2), and if    (1) <  / , then there exists a unique cutoff
¯     , such that    (¯     ) =  / ,    ( ) >  /  if   < ¯     , and    ( ) <  /  if   > ¯     .
To derive proposition 2(4), we only need to compare Φ( ,   ) and Φ( ,  ). Let
Γ( ) = Φ( , 
  )/Φ( , 
 ) =
1 −  [(  )(1 −  ) + (1 −   ) ]
1 −  /2
[2( 
 )
1− (1 −  
 )
 ]
 /(1− ) .
First, to demonstrate Γ( ) decreases in  , we only need to show
 
1 −  
  
  
1 −    >
 (2   − 1)
1 −     −  (1 − 2  ) 
.
33As the RHS decreases in  , it is no larger than
 (2 V −1)
1−  V , which is less than the LHS. To show
this, deﬁne  ( ) =  
1−   
 V
1− V −
 (2 V −1)
1−  V . It is easy to show  (   ) is increasing in   ; thus,
 (  ) >  (1/2) = 0.
Moreover, Γ(0) =
1−  V
1− /2 [2   ] /(1− ) and Γ(1) =
1− (1− V )
1− /2 [2(1 −   )] /(1− ). Given   ∈
(0,1),  ( ) = 1−  
1− /2[2 ] /(1− ) increases in   for   ∈ (0,1). Hence,    > 1/2 implies that
 (1 −   ) <  (1/2) = 1 <  (  ), which give the result Γ(1) < 1 < Γ(0). Therefore, there
exists a unique cutoff ¯     , such that   (¯     ) =    (¯     ),   ( ) >    ( ) if   < ¯     , and
  ( ) <    ( ) if   > ¯     . Moreover, because Φ( ,   ) and Φ( ,  ) are independent of  , the
cutoff ¯     is also independent of  .
Proposition 3 If ¯     < ¯     < ¯     , then the Lemma 1 holds.
Based on propositions 1(2) and 2(3), we know the intermediate input is produced in the North
if   <    {¯    , ¯     }. Moreover, it is easy to verify that three cutoffs must satisfy one of the
following order: (1) ¯     = ¯     = ¯     , (2) ¯     < ¯     < ¯     , and (3) ¯     < ¯     < ¯     . The
ﬁrst case has small likelihood to happen, and in the second case, the vertical integration will be
dominated by the choice of Northern production and arm’s length production in the South. This
case is not interesting. For the third case, for   < ¯     , its intermediate input is produced in the
North. For ¯     <   < ¯     , its intermediate input is produced by an integrated ﬁrm in the South.
And, for   > ¯     , its intermediate input is produced by an independent ﬁrm in the South. Thus,
the lemma 1 holds.
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Figure 1: Effect of Ownership Liberalization on the Extensive Margin
35 
 
   
Figure 2: Effect of Contract Enforcement on the Extensive Margin
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Source: Catalogue for the Guidance of Foregin Investment Industries (NDRC, various years).
Encouragement Policy Restriction Policy
Figure 4: Measure of Ownership Liberalization 1995-2007
37Table 1: Summary Statistics of China’s Processing Export
Year Processing export Share of Number of varieties (thousand)a Extensive Margin Index b
(billion dollar) intraﬁrm export Total Intraﬁrm Arm’s-length Total Intraﬁrm Arm’s-length
1997 99 0.29 56.4 25.9 48.4 0.42 0.27 0.33
1998 104 0.32 58.7 28.7 49.2 0.43 0.27 0.34
1999 111 0.36 61.0 31.5 50.3 0.43 0.30 0.35
2000 137 0.38 63.5 34.6 51.7 0.44 0.31 0.35
2001 147 0.41 55.6 30.8 42.7 0.45 0.33 0.35
2002 179 0.46 71.1 42.9 55.1 0.48 0.38 0.42
2003 241 0.52 67.3 41.9 48.9 0.56 0.45 0.44
2004 327 0.56 76.3 48.4 54.7 0.56 0.47 0.46
2005 415 0.60 84.9 55.3 59.9 0.58 0.49 0.50
2006 509 0.63 92.5 61.6 63.8 0.59 0.51 0.52
2007 616 0.64 98.8 66.6 67.8 0.77 0.65 0.67
a
Variety is deﬁned as an eight-digit HS product-destination country pair. Note that the total number of varieties is not equal to the sum
of the varieties by intraﬁrm and arm’s length export because different ﬁrms can export the same variety.
b
This index of extensive margin is based on Feenstra and Kee (2008), as explained in Equation (4).
3
8Table 2: Determinants of the Extensive Margin in Processing Export
Dependent variable: log(Extensive Margin Index)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intraﬁrm indicator -0.461*** -0.482*** -1.151*** -1.304*** -0.708*** -0.570***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.107) (0.170) (0.132) (0.199)
Encouragement policy 0.305*** 0.303*** 0.235*** 0.220*** 0.226*** 0.209***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.061)
Restriction policy -0.166*** -0.159*** -0.057 -0.031 -0.055 -0.040
(0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054)
Court efﬁciency 0.219 0.429 -0.115 -0.331 -0.079 0.095
(0.289) (0.566) (0.322) (0.675) (0.321) (0.614)
Policy zones 0.097*** 0.109*** 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.076*** 0.091***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement 0.169*** 0.168*** -0.520*** -0.776***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.160) (0.188)
Intraﬁrm × restriction -0.278*** -0.267*** -0.387** -0.753***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.165) (0.252)
Intraﬁrm × court efﬁciency 0.911** 1.633** -0.291 -0.756
(0.409) (0.667) (0.428) (0.713)
Intraﬁrm × zones 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.033***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement × court efﬁciency 2.247*** 3.201***
(0.488) (0.614)
Intraﬁrm × restriction × court efﬁciency -0.571 0.991
(0.533) (0.846)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement × zones -0.004 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
Intraﬁrm × restriction × zones 0.030*** 0.018**
(0.007) (0.007)
Ln(distance) -0.183*** -0.151*** -0.177*** -0.150*** -0.176*** -0.135***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.039) (0.046) (0.039) (0.044)
Coastal 0.852*** 0.815*** 0.893*** 0.867*** 0.882*** 0.789***
(0.090) (0.115) (0.091) (0.117) (0.091) (0.110)
Border 0.073 0.042 0.089 0.033 0.088 0.024
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070)
Ln(population density) 0.352*** 0.362*** 0.355*** 0.322*** 0.359*** 0.343***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038)
Ln(real output) 0.192*** 0.146** 0.214*** 0.228*** 0.212*** 0.204***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.057)
Skill intensity × college share 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Capital intensity × capital output ratio 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.031**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Constant -4.428*** -4.300*** -4.377*** -4.597*** -4.346*** -4.484***
(0.602) (0.683) (0.620) (0.702) (0.622) (0.682)
First-stage F-test 91.96 > 43.36 > 21.27
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industrial dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
  28555 28555 28555 28555 28555 28555
 2 0.466 0.466 0.471 0.469 0.472 0.470
Note: Variety is deﬁned as an eight-digit HS product-destination country pair. The panel covers 29 provinces and 112
industries in 1997-2007. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10,5,
and 1 percent levels.
39Table 3: Determinants of Processing Export: Alternative Measures of Extensive Margin
log(Number of Variety)a log(Extensive Margin Index)b
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intraﬁrm indicator -0.390*** -1.382*** -0.976*** -0.392*** -1.014*** -0.488***
(0.034) (0.146) (0.177) (0.024) (0.127) (0.147)
Encouragement policy 0.092*** 0.008 0.014 0.233*** 0.189*** 0.174***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045)
Restriction policy -0.023 0.101** 0.086** -0.139*** -0.039 -0.041
(0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.036) (0.040) (0.039)
Court efﬁciency 0.519 -0.381 -0.126 0.610 0.002 0.316
(0.656) (0.702) (0.631) (0.484) (0.552) (0.538)
Policy zones 0.120*** 0.098*** 0.104*** 0.083*** 0.069*** 0.072***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement 0.221*** -0.387*** 0.111*** -0.592***
(0.031) (0.135) (0.027) (0.125)
Intraﬁrm × restriction -0.305*** -0.412** -0.260*** -0.601***
(0.034) (0.189) (0.036) (0.187)
Intraﬁrm × court efﬁciency 2.069*** 0.603 1.365*** -0.079
(0.560) (0.647) (0.483) (0.545)
Intraﬁrm × zones 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.022*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement × court efﬁciency 2.123*** 2.034***
(0.450) (0.420)
Intraﬁrm × restriction × court efﬁciency 0.510 0.467
(0.655) (0.642)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement × zones -0.009** 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Intraﬁrm × restriction × zones -0.003 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006)
First-stage F-test 91.96 > 43.36 > 21.27 91.96 > 43.36 > 21.27
The constant and control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industrial dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
  28555 28555 28555 28555 28555 28555
 2 0.606 0.614 0.613 0.512 0.515 0.517
a
Variety is deﬁned as an eight-digit HS product-destinationcountry pair.
b
Variety is deﬁned as an eight-digit HS product using Feenstra and Kee’s (2008) index.
Note: The panel covers 29 provinces and 112 industries in 1997-2007. All regressions are estimated by GMM, with instru-
ments for court efﬁciency and its interactions. For brevity, we do not report the coefﬁcients for the constant and the control
variables speciﬁed in Table 2. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10,
5, and 1 percent levels.
40Table 4: Determinants of the Value of Processing Export
Dependent variable: log(Export Value)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)
Intraﬁrm indicator -0.667*** -1.821*** -1.111***
(0.051) (0.219) (0.304)
Encouragement policy 0.300*** 0.228*** 0.193**
(0.076) (0.083) (0.082)
Restriction policy -0.153** -0.035 -0.047
(0.063) (0.069) (0.068)
Court efﬁciency 0.121 -0.712 0.420
(0.962) (1.060) (0.921)
Policy zones 0.135*** 0.110*** 0.121***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement 0.131** -1.095***
(0.059) (0.251)
Intraﬁrm × restriction -0.275*** 0.071
(0.061) (0.363)
Intraﬁrm × court efﬁciency 1.764** -0.677
(0.872) (1.085)
Intraﬁrm × zones 0.061*** 0.068***
(0.009) (0.009)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement × court efﬁciency 4.253***
(0.838)
Intraﬁrm × restriction × court efﬁciency -1.188
(1.284)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement × zones -0.015*
(0.008)
Intraﬁrm × restriction × zones 0.005
(0.011)
First-stage F-test 91.96 > 43.36 > 21.27
The constant and control variables yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes
Industrial dummy yes yes yes
  28555 28555 28555
 2 0.477 0.482 0.482
Note: The dependent variable is the log export value to all countries. The panel covers
29 provinces and 112 industries in 1997-2007. All regressions are estimated by GMM,
with instruments for court efﬁciency and its interactions. For brevity, we do not report
the coefﬁcients for the constant and the control variables speciﬁed in Table 2. Cluster
robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10,
5, and 1 percent levels.
41Table 5: Determinants of Processing Export to High-income Countries
log(Extensive Margin Index)a log(Export Value)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intraﬁrm dummy -0.405*** -1.139*** -0.253 -0.583*** -1.634*** -0.723**
(0.034) (0.158) (0.194) (0.052) (0.196) (0.296)
Encouragement policy 0.272*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.251*** 0.140* 0.112
(0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.075) (0.080) (0.080)
Restriction policy -0.145*** 0.002 -0.011 -0.180*** -0.048 -0.071
(0.051) (0.056) (0.054) (0.066) (0.073) (0.071)
Court efﬁciency 1.219** 0.528 0.948 1.496* 0.443 1.652*
(0.529) (0.627) (0.581) (0.897) (1.010) (0.911)
Policy zones 0.110*** 0.089*** 0.093*** 0.139*** 0.110*** 0.123***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement 0.211*** -0.989*** 0.190*** -1.222***
(0.043) (0.203) (0.063) (0.289)
Intraﬁrm × restriction -0.300*** -0.735*** -0.285*** -0.011
(0.047) (0.277) (0.063) (0.384)
Intraﬁrm × court efﬁciency 1.392** -1.582** 1.506* -1.713*
(0.621) (0.695) (0.777) (1.034)
Intraﬁrm × zones 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.054*** 0.067***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement × court efﬁciency 4.138*** 4.909***
(0.654) (0.974)
Intraﬁrm × restriction × court efﬁciency 0.914 -0.725
(0.909) (1.319)
Intraﬁrm × encouragement × zones -0.015** -0.020**
(0.006) (0.010)
Intraﬁrm × restriction × zones 0.015** -0.002
(0.007) (0.010)
First-stage F-test 98.53 > 47.67 > 24.30 98.53 > 47.67 > 24.30
The constant and control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industrial dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
  27022 27022 27022 27022 27022 27022
 2 0.462 0.466 0.466 0.483 0.487 0.487
a
Variety is deﬁned as an eight-digit HS product-countrypair using Feenstra and Kee’s (2008) index.
Note: The sample covers China’s processing export to high-income countries. The panel covers 29 provinces and 112
industries in 1997-2007. All regressions are estimated by GMM, with instruments for court efﬁciency and its interactions.
For brevity, we do not report the coefﬁcients for the constant and the control variables speciﬁed in Table 2. Cluster robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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